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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16638 
LESTER RALPH ROMERO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with the criminal offense of 
Theft by Receiving, a second degree felony. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted at a bench trial on April 
2, 1979. A Motion in Arrest of Judgment was heard and later 
denied on May 17, 1979. On August 20, 1979, the appellant was 
sentenced to one to fifteen years in prison which was stayed 
pending a ninety day evaluation at the prison and further 
stayed pending this appeal. The appellant was admitted to bail. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the trial court's 
findings and its orders based thereon. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1 
Although respondent is in substantial agreement Witt I 
I 
I 
appellant's outline of events relevant to this appeal, a 
number of omm~ssions and distortions contained in appellant's 
I 
Statement of Facts warrant attention. 
I 
First, appellant's account of the circumstances \ 
i 
leading to the impounding of appellant's truck is misleading I 
because it omits pertinent facts contained in the record. I 
Appellant simply states that he refused to consent to a searer. 
of the truck he was driving, a deputy county attorney ordered i 
that the truck be seized, and Investigator Collins impounded 
the vehicle and the documents it contained. In fact, Inves-
tigator Collins testified that in his attempt to determine 
ownership of the truck, he explained in detail to appellant 
the peace officer responsibility to dispose of 




told Investigator Collins that the truck belonged to the 
i 
Golden Circle Investment Corp., that Mr. Bill Hamilton should' 
be contacted, but appellant could not supply a number at whict, 
Mr. Hamilton could be reached (R. 109, 110, 113). In accorda: 
with standard procedure the vehicle was impounded. 
Second, appellant's assertion that no impound inn~ 
was made is erroneous. Investigator Collins testified that a'. 
the scene of the arrest he and Sargeant Harwood inventoried t 
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contents of the truck, describing specifically the papers 
taken with him for safekeeping and listing generically the 
items left in the rear of the vehicle (R. 113, 114). Inves-
tigator Collins later dictated a report containing the 
inventory list using the notes he made at the scene (R. 115) • 
Investigator Collins stated that papers, documents, and items 
of apparent value were strewn across the front seat of the 
truck (R. 115, 116, 117). The defensive action of inventorying 
the contents of the truck was appropriate in light of Inves-
tigator Collins well-founded fear that he and his employer 
might be the target of false accusations of theft (R. 119) . 
Investigator Collins action of opening the envelope offered 
as Exhibit 4 was motivated by the same desire to protect the 
owner, himself, and the County Attorney's Office (R. 124). 
It was apparent to Investigator Collins that the envelope 
contained a check or money order and under the circumstances 
the only reasonable course of action was to open the envelope 
and determine the exact value of its contents. 
Third, appellant claims the search conducted by 
Investigator Collins was clearly investigatory in nature 
(App. brief p. 3). In support of this contention he offers 
the fact that Investigator Collins listed generically those 
items of little apparent value which he left in the truck. 
The fact that some miscellaneous tools, fishing gear, and 
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mechanical equipment were left in the truck becomes a hollow 
basis for appellant's argument when viewed in the light of 
Investigator Collins' testimony. The record reveals Inves-
tigator Collins was concerned only with protecting the owner\ 
I 
property from vandals and himself from accusations of theft 
(R. 241, 242). This singular motive was evidenced by the fac:\ 
that he offered to return the seized papers to appellants I 
previous attorney, Mr. Bown, who corroborated this testimony I 
(R. 263, 264). 
Fourth, appellant's assertion that Investigator 
Collins "had no probable cause to believe that any of the 
items seized were contraband, instrumentalities, or evidence 
of an offense" misleads by innuendo. This representation 
implies that Investigator Collins must have had probable 
cause to conduct the search when in fact probable cause 
considerations are irrelevant to an inventory search. 
Fifth, appellant claims information used by the 
county attorney's office to obtain a search warrant could 
have been gained only through access to privileged attorney· I 
! 
client conversation. Appellant moved to arrest judgment 
based on "newly discovered" information which would support 1 
this allegation. Appellant stated the newly discovered 
evidence was Mr. McLachlan's admission that he was the 
confidential informant who passed on information received 
-4-
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through access to privileged conversation (R. 225). Appellant 
never did present such testimony despite the fact that Mr. 
McLachlan was present and apparently willing to testify when 
the motion to arrest judgment was argued (R. 303). 
Appellant's argument that information used to obtain 
the search warrant was gained in violation of an attorney-
client privilege is clouded by appellant's own testimony. 
Appellant testified that he could have talked to"somebody" 
about the papers taken from the truck "at other times" (R. 160, 
161) • 
POINT I 
THE INVENTORY SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S 
VEHICLE WAS REASONABLE AND THEREFORE 
NOT A VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMeNT. 
Appellant condemns as unreasonable the seizure of 
papers for safekeeping by officers conducting an inventory 
search of the vehicle appellant was driving at the time of 
his arrest. It is undisputed that the Fourth Amendment forbids 
unreasonable searches. However, courts have long recognized 
that inventory searches are reasonable and, therefore, an 
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. This 
inventory exception was developed in order to insure protection 
of the owner's property, to protect the police against claims 
or disputes over lost or stolen property, and to protect the 
police from dangerous instrumentalities. South Dakota v. 
-5-
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I 
I 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 49 L. Ed.2d 1000, 96 S.Ct. 3092 (1976;: 
I 
In determining whether police have engaged genuineh; 
in a caretaking search of an impounded vehicle, the United 
States Suprem~ Court in the Opperman case, supra, focused 
upon several factors as being dispositive of the issue. They 
are: the vehicle is lawfully impounded; the owner is not 
present or available to make other arrangements for the safe· 
keeping of his belongings; the inventory is prompted by the 
presence in plain view of a number of valuables inside the 
vehicle; and that this standard procedure is not a pretext 
concealing an investigatory motive. 
As the record in the instant case reveals, this 
outlined in Opperman, supra, is easily satisfied. Testimony 
disclosed that appellant was under full custodial arrest 
pursuant to a felony warrant. Appellant disclaimed ownership; 
I 
of the vehicle and its contents and he could not locate an I 
authorized agent of the corporate owner of the truck. Arres~ 
I 
officers relayed this information to a deputy county attorney' 
who advised them to follow the standard procedure of impound~I 
the vehicle. Investigator Collins testified that only aftu. 
calling a tow truck to impound the vehicle did he realize the; 
necessity of inventorying its contents. The judgment was mai' 
upon the observation of several papers and documents of 
apparent value strewn across the front seat of the truck. 
-6-
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During the inventory Investigator Collins found several bank 
checks drawn upon different accounts, one in the amount of 
over $1,000.00. Investigator Collins also discovered an 
executed deed to real property, a title abstract, and a 
sealed addressed envelope. Close examination of the envelope 
revealed that it contained a check or money order. Investigator 
Collins testified that this discovery prompted him to open 
the envelope to determine the exact value of its contents. 
This action to protect the owner's property and to protect 
himself and his employer from subsequent allegations of theft 
was reasonable due to the ease with which an envelope could 
be opened. 
Appellant cites United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 
53 L.Ed.2d 538, 97 S.Ct. 2476 (1977), as controlling in the 
instant case. Chadwick involved the warrantless search of a 
double locked footlocker officers believed contained contraband. 
In Chadwick, supra, the Supreme Court stated that the fact 
that the footlocker was double locked indicated an expectation 
that its contents remain concealed from public view. This 
expectation of privacy could be violated only after officers 
had secured a search warrant. This singular consideration of 
Chadwick renders it easily distinguishable from the instant 
case which involved dual competing considerations. It is 
conceded that there is an expectation of privacy in sealed 
-7-
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envelopes. However, the record of the instant case reveals, 
unlike Chadwick, that the contents of the envelope were 
discernable upon outward examination. Investigator Collins 
saw through the envelope that it contained not a personal 
letter but a check or money order. This discovery diminished: 
the importance of the privacy interest and emphasized the 
need to protect the arresting officers and department from 
subsequent accusations of theft. It also crystalized the 
need to safeguard the property. For unlike the situation 
in Chadwick, a thief could easily substitute an empty 
facimile for the envelope impounded or exchange the contents 
.of the envelope leaving no sign of tampering. For example, 
the owner could have claimed that the money orders he found 
in the envelope upon its return were not those he originally 
placed in it which were of greater value. The police having 
impounded an item so easily tampered with would be helpless 
to refute such a claim. 
The obvious inference to be drawn from appellant's 
argument is that Investigator Collins gave false testimony re-
garding the inventory nature of the search. Appellant allege; 
contrary to Investigator Collins' testimony, the search was 
merely a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive. 
logic of this argument is seriously flawed. For if Investigi: 
Collins had been willing to lie regarding the purpose of the 
-8-
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search he would also have lied about the very existence of 
the envelope. Such a lie would certainly have better served 
the alleged purpose of the search. 
The questions of the reasonableness of the search 
and the veracity of the witness' testimony were resolved by 
the trial court. That ruling should not be upset unless 
persuasively shown to be in error. State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 
120 (Utah 1976). This standard for appellate review was 
elaborated upon by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Criscola, 
444 P.2d 517 (Utah 1968). In that case the Court stated: 
Id.at 519. 
Due to the responsibility of the trial 
court in controlling the admissibility 
of evidence, and his advantage position 
to pass on such matters, it is his 
prerogative to make this determination. 
For these reasons his ruling should be 
indulged with a presumption of correctness 
and should not be disturbed unless it 
clearly appears that he was in error. 
[Citations omitted.] 
Respondent submits that the inventory search was 
reasonable and, therefore the trial court's ruling should 
be upheld. 
POINT II 
THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING THE SEARCH 
WARRANT CONTAINED A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS 
TO SUPPORT THE MAGISTRATE'S PROBABLE 
CAUSE DETERMINATION 
Appellant contends Investigator Collins' affidavit 
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did not contain facts from which a magistrate could assess 
the credibility of the confidential informant and therefore 
it was inadequate to support a probable cause determination. 
This contention must be analyzed in the context of those 
Supreme Court cases which have defined probable cause for 
the purpose of obtaining a search warrant. Beck v. Ohio, I 
379 U.S. 89, 13 L.Ed.2d 142, 85 S.Ct. 223 (1964), established 1 
the proposition that only a probability, and not a prirna 
facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probabl\ 
cause. The Beck standard was affirmed in McCray v. Illinois, 
386 U.S. 300, 87 s.ct. 1056 (1967), which held that affadavit 
.of probable cause are tested by much less rigorous standards 
than those governing the admissibility of evidence at trial. f 
In United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741 {Bil 
the Supreme Court granted magistrates much leeway in making 
probable cause determinations. The Ventresca Court stated, 
"magistrates are not to be confined by niggardly limitations 
or by restrictions on the use of their common sense." Id. ad 
Consistent with Ventresca, supra, was the earlier case of 
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725 (1960). 
In Jones, supra, the Court held that an affadavit in support 
of a search warrant should be considered adequate if there 
is a "substantial basis" for crediting the hearsay it cont~ 
The Jones Court also noted tnat a magistrates determination 
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of probable cause should be granted great deference by 
reviewing courts. Id. at 271. 
In the context of these cases appellant's emphasis 
on the fact that the affadivit contained no averment that the 
confidential informant had furnished reliable tips in the 
past must be interpreted as an hypertechnical concern with 
the wording of the affadavit. 
In support of his argument appellant cites the case 
of Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L.Ed.2d 637, 
89 s.ct. 584 (1969), in which the United States Supreme court 
applied and explained the test for probable cause announced 
in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, 84 S.Ct. 
1509 (1964). These cases require that the affadavit contain 
information concerning underlying circumstances to allow the 
magistrate to judge the validity of the informant's conclusion 
and averments regarding past performance to support the 
reliability of an informants tip. 
The first prong of this test is easily satisfied in 
the present case. The confidential informant stated that 
appellant told him a stolen black and silver semi-tractor 
truck was being kept at the ABC storage unit. Appellant was 
also linked to ABC through an envelope addressed to ABC con-
taining money orders which was found in his vehicle at the 
time of his arrest. Additional information connecting 
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appellant to the stolen truck in the A.B.C. storage unit 
came from Mr. Ron Lyle an inmate at the Utah State Prison. 
Mr. Lyle admitted having stolen the semi-tractor at appellant'' 
request. Mr .. Lyle provided a detailed description of the 
truck including the alteration of its color which corroboratJ 
the confidential informant's statement. Mr. Lyle also placed, 
the stolen truck in the A. B. C. storage unit ten months prior I 
to the application of the warrant. An independent police 
investigation of the theft of the truck corroborated Mr. Ly!E 
statement. Finally, the owner of A.B.C. storage linked 
appellant to the storage unit through identification of the 
_addressed envelope which was strikingly similar to those 
he usually received containing rent for the unit. 
Mr. Lyle's statement against interest, corroboratec 
by independent sources, in conjunction with the confidential 
informant's tip which was also supported by additional 
information provided a substantially detailed basis for 
crediting the hearsay contained in the affadavit. ~ 
States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 580, 29 L.Ed.2d 723, 91 S.~ 
2075 (1971). See also: State v. Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (1977);1 
State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 846 (1972); and 
State v. Smelser, 23 Utah 2d 347, 463 P.2d 562 (1970). 
Although the affadavit in the present case contat 
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no statement of prior reliability the United States Supreme 
Court in the Harris case, supra, observed that such statements 
were unnecessary since the inquiry as to probable cause 
concerns whether the informer's present tip was truthful or 
reliable. See also State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499 
P. 2d 846 (1972). 
In the present case the magistrate was presented 
with an affadavit containing a complex pattern of detailed 
corroborated information. Appellant attacks the sufficiency 
of the affadavit because it does not contain a statement 
regarding the past performance of the confidential informant 
or a statement of whether the named informant received a 
benefit in exchange for his information. In the Harris case, 
supra, the United States Supreme Court observed that neither 
statement urged as requisite by the appellant are necessary 
to a probable cause determination if a substantial basis for 
finding probable cause is evident. Respondent submits that 
the affadavit in question meets this standard. 
-13-
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO COMPEL 
DISCLOSURE OF THE IDENTITY OF THE 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The.State has a privilege to refuse to disclose 
the identity of an informer unless the trial court finds that 
his identity has already been disclosed or disclosure is 
essential to assure a fair determination of the issues. Utah 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 36. The defendant has the burden of 
demonstrating that the informant would be a material witness 
on the issue of guilt. State v. Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d 135, 
139, 514 P.2d 800, 803 (1973). Further, a defendant may 
not compel disclosure of an informant's identity to contest 
the probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. 
Id. at 138, 514 P.2d at 802. Respondent avers that appel~~ 
has not carried his burden of showing that the informant was 
a material witness. 
I 
Appellant argues that he was prevented from raising' 
a Sixth Amendment violation at the suppression hearing. In 
fact appellant was concerned at the hearing with challenging, 
I 
the validity of the search. In addition, there was ample 
testimony indicating that no Sixth Amendment violation had 
occurred. Investigator Collins testified that the source of 
the informer's tip was the appellant himself who told others 
-14-
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during a conversation at a trailer park that he had a stolen 
truck in storage at A.B.C. The informer was specifically 
told that privileged information was not wanted by the 
prosecutors office. 
Most of the cases focusing upon Rule 36 have 
involved situations where disclosure is relevant and helpful 
to the accused's defense or is necessary for a fair deter-
mination of the issues. Courts have uniformly recognized: 
An appellant seeking to overcome the 
state's policy of protecting an informant's 
identity, has the burden of proving that the 
informant is likely to have evidence bearing 
on the merits of the case ... His burden 
extends only to a showing that, in view of 
the evidence, the informer would be a material 
witness on the issue of guilt which might 
result in exoneration and that nondisclosure 
of his identity would deprive the-defendant 
of a fair trial. 
State v. Tuell, 541 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Ariz. 1975). In the 
present case, appellant has not made any showing as to 
how the informant's testimony would have been material to 
the issue of appellant's guilt. In addition, appell'ant 
could easily have subpoenaed the person he felt was the 
informant as a witness if the informant's testimony would 
have helped appellant's defense. As the Supreme Court of 
Colorado recently stated: 
. the accused is required to 
make at least a minimal affirmative 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
showing of the need for disclosure; and 
... a defendant's mere unsupported 
assertion that he desires disclosure is 
not enough. A defendant's speculations, 
without more, will not support a conclu-
sion that the informant would be of any 
substantial assistance in his defense. 
People v. Langford, Colo., 550 P.2d 329 (1976). See also 
State v. Bankhead, 514 P.2d 800 (Utah 1973). 
Finally, and most importantly, it is clear from 
the record that appellant in fact knew the identity of the 
informant. Nevertheless, appellant did not call him to 
testify. Appellant's failure to call Mr. McLachlan is 
inconsistent with his present argument that Mr. McLachlan's 
.testimony would have been relevant to his defense. 
In the recent case of Lopez v. State, 574 S.W. 2d 
563 (Tex. Cr. App. 1978), the court held that although 
normally disclosure would be required if the informant playe 
a prominent part in bringing the offense about or was a 
material witness, where the defendant and his counsel ~ 
the identity of the informer and there is no indication that 
the defendant could not have produced the informant as a 
witness or that his testimony is unavailable, it is not errc 
to refuse to compel disclosure. To the same effect is ~ 
v. Hull, 487 P.2d 1314 (Mont. 1971). 
Respondent submits that the trial court's ruling 
not to disclose the identity of the confidential informant 1 
not erroneous. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT BECAUSE APPELLANT 
FAILED TO CARRY HIS BURDEN OF GOING FORWARD 
ON THE MOTION. 
Appellant moved to arrest judgment based on "newly 
discovered" information. This information consisted of Mr. 
McLachlan's admission that he was the confidential informant 
who passed on information received from a privileged con-
versation (R. 225) . Appellant never did present such testimony 
despite the fact that Mr. McLachlan was present and apparently 
willing to testify (R. 303). 
Instead appellant presented testimony of Mr. Bown, 
appellants former attorney, indicating that appellant had 
discussed the contents of the A.B.C. storage unit with him 
in the presence of Mr. McLachlan. Mr. Bown's testimony is 
not relevant to the issue because he could not testify regarding 
additional conversations appellant may have had with other 
individuals. Appellant argues that the case of Black v. 
United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966) and that of O'Brien v. 
United States, 386 U.S. 345 (1966) established a per se rule 
requiring reversal of any conviction if the case involved 
any breach of secrecy of attorney-client communications 
(App. brief p. 21). This argument is without merit. The 
United States Supreme court in Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 
U.S. 545, 51 L.Ed.2d 30, 90 S.Ct. 837 (1977) stated: 
-17-
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We cannot agree that these cases, 
individually or together, either re-
quire or suggest the rule announced 
by the Court of Appeals and now urged 
by Bursey. Both Black and O'Brien 
involved surreptitious electronic 
surveillance by the Government, which 
was discovered after trial and conviction 
and which was plainly illegal under the 
Fourth Amendment. In each case, some, 
but not all, of the conversations over-
heard were between the criminal defendant 
and his counsel during trial preparation. 
The conviction in each case was set aside 
and a new trial ordered. The explanatory 
per curiarn in Black, although referring 
to the overheard conversations with counsel, 
did not rule that whenever conversations 
with counsel are overheard the Sixth 
Amendment is violated and a new trial must 
be had. Indeed, neither the Sixth Amendment 
nor the right to counsel was even mentioned 
in the short opinion. It is difficult to 
believe that the Court in Black and O'Brien 
was evolving a definitive construction of 
the Sixth Amendment without identifying 
the Amendment it was interpreting, especially 
in view of the well-established Fourth 
Amendment grounds for excluding the fruits 
of the illegal surveillance. 
Id. at 432. 
The Weatherford Court in discussing the contours 
of Sixth Amendment Rights stated that violation of those 
rights would occur only if there was tainted evidence, a 
communication of defense strategy to the prosecution, and 
a purposeful intrusion by an agent. The evidence in this 
case fell short of satisfying the Weatherford test. 
-18-
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The evidence presented by appellant at the hearing 
on his motion to arrest judgment failed to establish a Sixth 
Amendment violation. Appellant's failure to call Mr. McLachlan 
and his failure to present evidence in the light of testimony 
by the prosecution witness that no privileged information 
was obtained by the prosecution require affirmance of the 
ruling denying the motion to arrest judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the routine inventory search 
conducted by Investigator Collins was constitutional and 
therefore the prosecution was not obligated to ignore the 
nature of items impounded. In addition the search of the A.B.C. 
storage unit was made pursuant to a search warrant and was 
valid. 
Appellant has failed to carry his burden in establishi~g 
that rulings of the lower court were erroneous. Therefore this 
conviction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
OLGA AGNELLO-RASPA 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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